Given a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where each vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference, we consider the problem of computing a largest matching in the set of popular matchings in G. A matching M is said to be popular if there is no matching where more vertices are happier than in M . The set of popular matchings is non-empty since every stable matching is popular and it is known that stable matchings always exist in G. The problem of computing a popular matching of maximum size in G = (A ∪ B, E) was considered in [8] where an O(mn0) algorithm was shown, where m = |E| and n0 = min(|A|, |B|). Here we show an O(m) algorithm for this problem.
Introduction
The input here is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where each vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. Every vertex u ∈ A ∪ B seeks to be assigned to one of its neighbors. Preference lists can be incomplete, which means that a vertex may be adjacent to only some of the vertices on the other side. Also, * Part of this work was done during a visit to the Max-PlanckInstitut für Informatik, Saarbrücken under the IMPECS program.
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preference lists are symmetric, i.e., a belongs to b's list if and only if b belongs to a's list, for any pair of vertices a and b. Such an instance G is called an instance of the stable marriage problem with incomplete lists and it is customary to refer to the vertices in A and B as men and women, respectively. We will also refer to G as a bipartite graph with 2-sided strict preference lists. We assume that no vertex is isolated, so m ≥ n/2, where |E| = m and |A ∪ B| = n.
A matching M is a set of edges, no two of which share an endpoint. For any vertex x that is matched in M , let M (x) denote x's partner in M . An edge (u, v) is a blocking edge to M if both u and v prefer each other to their respective assignments in M , i.e., u is either unmatched in M or prefers v to M (u) and similarly, v is either unmatched in M or prefers u to M (v). A matching M is stable if M has no blocking edges. The existence of stable matchings in every instance G and the Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] to compute a stable matching are classical results in graph algorithms. Though the original Gale-Shapley algorithm assumed that all preference lists are complete, it is straightforward to generalize this algorithm to incomplete lists [7] .
A stable matching has usually been considered the best way of matching vertices in G = (A ∪ B, E). However, stability is a very strong condition and it has been shown that all stable matchings in G have the same size and they all leave the same vertices unmatched [5] . There are many problems, where it is desirable to have matchings of larger size, for instance, in allocating projects to students, where the total absence of blocking edges is not necessary and a more relaxed notion of stability suffices. The notion of popularity captures a natural relaxation of the notion of stability: blocking edges are permitted in a popular matching M , nevertheless M has overall stability. That is, in popular matchings, pairwise stability gets replaced by global stability. We define popular matchings next.
of vertices that prefer M 0 to M 1 . We say that M 0 is more popular than M 1 if φ(M 0 , M 1 ) > φ(M 1 , M 0 ).
Definition 1. A matching M is popular if
Popularity captures global stability since there is no matching where more vertices are better-off than in M , where M is a popular matching. Gärdenfors [6] introduced the notion of popularity in the context of stable matchings. Every stable matching is popular [2] : when comparing a stable matching S to any matching M ′ , note that for any edge e ∈ M ′ , both the endpoints of e cannot prefer M ′ to S -if they do, then it contradicts the stability of S. Hence if one endpoint of e prefers M ′ to S, then the other endpoint has to prefer S to M ′ . Thus the number of votes in favor of M ′ is at most the number of votes in favor of S, hence M ′ cannot be more popular than S.
Since stable matchings always exist in a stable marriage instance, popular matchings also always exist in a stable marriage instance. It is easy to come up with simple instances where we have a strict containment: {stable matchings} ⊂ {popular matchings} as seen in this example. Let A = {a 1 , a 2 } and B = {b 1 , b 2 } and let the preference lists be as shown below. Here a 1 's top choice is b 1 and second choice is b 2 while a 2 has a single neighbor b 1 . The vertex b 1 's top choice is a 1 and second choice is a 2 while b 2 has a single neighbor a 1 . The matching {(a 1 , b 1 )} is the only stable matching here, while {(a 1 , b 2 ), (a 2 , b 1 )} is popular but unstable. It has been shown that a stable matching is a smallest or minimum cardinality popular matching [8] . There are instances, as in our example above, where a largest popular matching can be twice as large as a stable matching.
So in problems where we are ready to substitute stability with popularity, for the sake of obtaining a matching of larger size, the desired matching is a maximum size or largest popular matching. The only polynomial time algorithm known for computing such a matching is an O(mn 0 ) algorithm from [8] , where n 0 = min(|A|, |B|) and m = |E|. We show the following result here. Thus we have a linear time algorithm to compute a largest popular matching in a stable marriage instance G = (A ∪ B, E) and the complexity of computing a largest popular matching is the same as that of computing a stable matching. We will show in Section 3 that a largest popular matching has size at least 2 3 |M * |, where M * is a maximum cardinality matching in G and we show simple examples at the end of this section where this bound is tight.
There are some applications, for instance, in assigning training positions to trainees, where we cannot compromise on the size of the matching, so a largest popular matching may not always be the best matching in such applications. Here the matching has to be of maximum cardinality in G, and among such matchings, we want a "best" matching. So what we seek here is a maximum cardinality matching M * such that for all maximum cardinality matchings M ′ , we have Though M * is popular within the set M, note that M * could be quite unpopular in the set of all matchings in G. In order to measure the unpopularity of a matching, we need the following definition. In any instance G, let us measure by what factor one matching (say, M 1 ) can be more popular than another (say, M 0 ) as follows:
A matching M is popular if and only if u(M ) ≤ 1. We show in Section 3 that u(M * ) ≤ n 0 − 1, where n 0 = min(|A|, |B|), and we also show a simple example where this bound is tight.
While the solution as given by Theorem 1.1 is a maximum cardinality matching within the set of popular matchings and whose size is lower bounded by 2 3 |M * |, the solution as given by Theorem 1.2 is a popular matching within the set of maximum cardinality matchings and whose unpopularity factor is upper bounded by n 0 − 1. It is natural to ask if there are matchings sandwiched between these two extremes. We show that there is an entire spectrum of such matchings and these can be computed efficiently.
When the parameter k = n 0 , Theorem 1.3 promises a matching M n0 such that |M n0 | = |M * |. It will be shown in Section 3 that this matching M n0 will, in fact, be popular within M -thus this is the matching described in Theorem 1.2. When k = 2, Theorem 1.3 promises a matching M 2 such that u(M 2 ) ≤ 1, i.e., M 2 is popular. It will be shown in Section 2 that this matching M 2 will be a largest popular matching -thus this is the matching described in Theorem 1.1.
1.1.1 Our approach. We now outline the main ideas used here. Our algorithm for k = 2 partitions the vertex set A ∪ B into two layers: bottom and top. To begin with, the top layer is empty. At any point in time, the vertices of A (call them men) in the top layer are there because they could not find partners by being in the bottom layer. In this algorithm, the top layer men get preferential treatment -in each iteration, the top layer men first make their proposals and the vertices of B (call them women) that they seek are confined to the top layer. Only the women not sought after by them are available to the bottom layer men.
So in each iteration, the Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm is first run with the top layer men proposing and all the women who received proposals disposing, let S 1 denote this matching. All the women who are matched in S 1 move to the top layer. The men in the bottom layer then run the stable matching algorithm with the women left in the bottom layer to yield a matching S 0 . Refer to Figure 1 . If all the bottom layer men get matched in S 0 , then S 1 ∪ S 0 is returned. Else the unmatched men in the bottom layer are promoted to the top layer and the next iteration begins.
Suppose we run the above algorithm on the simple example on 4 vertices {a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 } described earlier: a 1 and b 1 are each other's top choices while a 2 's only neighbor is b 1 and b 2 's only neighbor is a 1 . To begin with, all the vertices are in the bottom layer. Though top layer men propose first in every iteration, however since the top layer is empty in the first iteration, we have S 1 = ∅ in the first iteration and we compute a stable matching in the bottom layer with all the men proposing and women disposing, so S 0 = {(a 1 , b 1 )}. Then the vertex a 2 , who is unmatched in S 0 , gets promoted to the top layer. In the second iteration, the vertex a 2 gets to propose first and this yields S 1 = {(a 2 , b 1 )}.
Figure 1: M2 = S1 ∪ S0, where S1 (similarly, S0) is stable in the graph induced on A1 ∪ B (resp., A0 ∪ B0).
The bottom layer vertices are a 1 and b 2 . Since there is an edge between a 1 and b 2 , we get
The termination condition is now satisfied. Thus the matching {(a 2 , b 1 ), (a 1 , b 2 )} is returned. Let M 2 be the matching in G computed by this algorithm. When the algorithm terminates, let A 1 (similarly, A 0 ) denote the set of men in the top (resp., bottom) layer and let B 1 (similarly, B 0 ) denote the set of women in the top (resp., bottom) layer. See Figure 1 . The matching M 2 has the following crucial properties:
• All the unmatched men are in A 1 and all the unmatched women are in B 0 .
• Any blocking edge to M 2 has to be in A 0 × B 1 .
• For any edge (a, b) ∈ A 1 × B 0 , a prefers M 2 (a) to b and b prefers M 2 (b) to a.
These three properties allow us to show that M 2 is a largest popular matching in G. Note that the idea of "promoting" an unmatched man is reminiscent to a similar step in Király's approximation algorithms [11] for a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching in G = (A ∪ B, E) where vertices have ties in their preference lists. However, since the goal in Király's algorithms is to compute a matching that admits no blocking edges, the promotion step is only to break ties in the preference lists, whereas in our algorithm, the promotion of an unmatched man from the bottom layer to the top layer may create blocking edges. Nevertheless, the resulting matching will be popular.
Though it may seem as though our algorithm may need to call a stable matching subroutine several times due to vertices getting promoted from the bottom layer to the top layer, we will construct this matching in linear time by a single invocation of a modified Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm in a graphG 2 that is derived from G. This algorithm is given in Section 2.
To contrast this algorithm with the one in [8] to compute a largest popular matching, the algorithm in [8] computes a set L ⊂ A ∪ B is in an iterative manner (using the stable matching algorithm) such that when the stable matching algorithm is run with vertices of L proposing to those in R = (A ∪ B) \ L, every vertex in R gets matched and no neighbor in L is preferred to its assignment in M by any vertex in L, where M is the resulting matching. It was shown in [8] that such a matching M has to be a largest popular matching. In order to construct an L that satisfies the above properties, this algorithm may use Θ(n 0 ) iterations, where n 0 = min(|A|, |B|). Thus this algorithm takes O(mn 0 ) time.
1.1.2 The generalized algorithm. We generalize our algorithm on 2 layers to an algorithm on k layers, for any k ≥ 2. As in the case for k = 2, at the very beginning, all the men are in the bottom layer or layer 0. In each iteration the men in the topmost layer (layer k − 1) propose first to all the womencall this matching S k−1 . Then the men in layer k − 2 propose to the women left unmatched in S k−1 -call this matching S k−2 . In decreasing order, for every i ≥ 0, the men in layer i propose to the women left unmatched in ∪ j>i S j . If all the men, except those in the top layer, are matched in S = ∪ k−1 i=0 S i , then S is returned; otherwise the unmatched men of layer i are promoted to layer i+1, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ k − 2, and the next iteration begins. Let M k be the matching returned by this algorithm.
For any matching M ′ , the set M k ⊕M ′ is a collection of alternating paths and alternating cycles with respect to M k . Any path/cycle ρ where alternate edges in ρ belong to M k is called an alternating path/cycle with respect to M k . We prove Theorem 1.4 in Section 3. 
The above theorem implies that u(M k ) ≤ k − 1. (Thus M 2 , the matching computed when k = 2, will be a popular matching.) The k-layer partition obtained in our algorithm also allows us to show that any augmenting path with respect to M k has length at least 2k + 1, which implies that
* is a maximum cardinality matching in G. This implies that when k = n 0 , the resulting matching M n0 is of maximum cardinality and properties (1) and (2) of Theorem 1.4 enable us to show that M n0 is popular restricted to the set of maximum cardinality matchings.
Background and Related results.
Popular matchings have been studied extensively during the last few years [1, 13, 12, 10, 15, 14, 9, 16] in the case where only vertices of A have preferences while vertices of B have no preferences -this is the 1-sided preference lists model. Thus each edge e = (a, b) in G has a rank associated with it (the rank that a assigns to b) and it is only vertices in A that cast their votes. There are simple examples here that admit no popular matching. Abraham et al. [1] gave efficient algorithms to determine if a given instance admits a popular matching or not and if so, to compute one of maximum size. McCutchen [14] introduced two measures of unpopularity: unpopularity factor and unpopularity margin and he showed that the problem of computing a matching in the domain of 1-sided preference lists that minimized either of these measures is NP-hard.
Gärdenfors [6] , who originated the notion of popular matchings, considered this problem in the domain of 2-sided preference lists. Biró, Manlove, and Mittal [3] showed that the problem of computing a maximum cardinality matching here that minimized the number of blocking edges is NP-hard to approximate to within n 1−ǫ 0 , for any ǫ > 0. When ties are allowed in preference lists here, it was shown by Biró, Irving, and Manlove [2] that the problem of computing an arbitrary popular matching in a stable marriage instance is NP-hard. As mentioned earlier, the first polynomial time algorithm for computing a largest popular matching in a stable marriage instance with strict preference lists was given in [8] and its running time is O(mn 0 ).
Some Examples.
We first show an example G = (A ∪ B, E) where the size of a largest popular matching is 2 3 (the size of a maximum cardinality matching in G). Let the set A be {a 1 , a 2 , a 3 } and the set B be {b 0 , b 1 , b 2 }. The edges and preferences are given in Figure 2 .
Figure 2: The preferences of the vertices are indicated on the edges: 1 is top choice while 2 is second choice. The bold edges form the largest popular matching and the dashed edges form the maximum cardinality matching.
In the above example, the largest popular matching is {(a 1 , b 1 ), (a 2 , b 2 )} and it has size 2 while the maximum cardinality matching is {(a 1 , b 0 ), (a 2 , b 1 ), (a 3 , b 2 )} of size 3. This example can be easily generalized to 6t vertices, for any integer t ≥ 1, by making t copies of the graph shown in Figure 2 with no edges between any of the copies, so that the largest popular matching has size 2t while the maximum cardinality matching has size 3t.
An instance where u(M * ) is high. We now show an example G = (A ∪ B, E) on 2n 0 vertices, where |A| = |B| = n 0 , such that a maximum cardinality matching M * that is popular within the set M of maximum cardinality matchings has a high unpopularity factor in the set of all matchings in G. This is a generalization of the instance on 6 vertices given in Figure 2 .
Let A = {a 1 , . . . , a n0 } and B = {b 0 , . . . , b n0−1 } and for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n 0 − 1, the preference list of a i is b i (top choice) followed by b i−1 (second choice). The vertex a n0 has only one neighbor, which is b n0−1 . The vertex b 0 has only one neighbor, which is a 1 . For each 1 ≤ i ≤ n 0 − 1, the preference list of b i is a i (top choice) followed by a i+1 (second choice).
There is only one maximum cardinality matching here, which is
2 An algorithm for a largest popular matching Recall that our input here is a bipartite graph G = (A ∪ B, E) where each vertex ranks its neighbors in a strict order of preference. For convenience, we will refer to vertices in A as men and the vertices in B as women. We assume without loss of generality that |A| ≤ |B|, so n 0 = min(|A|, |B|) = |A|.
The following algorithm, where the set of vertices gets partitioned into top and bottom, was outlined in Section 1. To begin with, all the vertices are in the bottom layer, i.e., A 0 = A and B 0 = B while A 1 = B 1 = ∅. In every iteration, we do the following:
• Run the Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm on the vertex set A 1 ∪ B with the vertices in A 1 proposing and the vertices in B disposing. Let S 1 be the resulting matching.
• Let B 1 ⊆ B be the women who are matched in S 1 . Let B 0 = B \ B 1 . Run the stable matching algorithm on A 0 ∪ B 0 now. That is, vertices in A 0 can propose only to the vertices in B 0 and these women dispose. Let S 0 be the resulting matching.
• If all vertices of A 0 are matched in S 0 , then return S 0 ∪S 1 . Else delete all the unmatched vertices from A 0 and add them to A 1 . -Then come the bottom layer copies of all the neighbors of b in the same order of preference.
So if a woman b receives a proposal from a top layer neighbor, she will henceforth reject proposals from all bottom layer neighbors. In fact, we can say that in the Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm, when a woman receives an offer, she immediately deletes edges to worse ranked neighbors since such offers will henceforth never be accepted by her. Thus as soon as a woman receives a proposal from a top layer neighbor, she deletes all edges incident to bottom layer neighbors, thus the bottom layer men can only propose to those women who do not receive proposals from top layer men.
Our algorithm is to construct the desired matching inG 2 = (Ã 2 ∪ B,Ẽ) is given as Algorithm1. This algorithm is essentially the same as running the GaleShapley algorithm inG 2 , except for some modifications. In the Gale-Shapley algorithm, all the men inÃ 2 should propose. However at the very beginning, we want only the bottom layer men to propose since the top layer is empty. So our initialization step initializes the queue Q of active men to the bottom layer men {a 
delete the first element a ℓ from Q.
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let b be the most preferred neighbor of a ℓ now. 6. ifM (b) exists then add this manM (b) to Q.
delete all edges that b ranks worse than (a ℓ , b).
9
. else if ℓ = 0 then 10.
add a ℓ+1 to Q. {So a end if 12. end while 13. ReturnM .
In the Gale-Shapley algorithm, every man who has not yet found a partner, will propose in decreasing order of preference till he is accepted by some neighbor or he gets rejected by all his neighbors. Any offer that a woman receives is always from a better neighbor than her current partner since she deletes edges to worse ranked neighbors upon receiving a proposal. So when a woman receives a proposal, if she is already matched, she rejects her current partner and this man is inserted into Q, since he has to find a new partner now. If a man gets rejected by all his neighbors, then he will be unmatched in the final matching output by the GaleShapley algorithm.
In our algorithm the modification is that once a bottom layer man a The following definition will be useful in showing the properties satisfied by M 2 .
Definition 3. For any u ∈ A ∪ B and neighbors x and y of u, define u's vote between x and y, denoted by vote u (x, y), as follows: it is 1 if u prefers x to y, it is −1 if u prefers y to x, else it is 0 (i.e., x = y).
Label each e = (u, v) in E \ M 2 by (α e , β e ), where α e = vote u (v, M 2 (u)) and β e = vote v (u, M 2 (v)); in case x is unmatched in M 2 , then vote x (y, M 2 (x)) = 1 for any neighbor y of x, since every vertex prefers being matched with any of its neighbors to being unmatched. Lemmas 2.1 and 2.2 show crucial properties of M 2 .
Lemma 2.1. Every (1, 1) edge has to be in
Proof. During the entire course of Algorithm 1, no woman in B 0 ever receives a proposal from a top layer neighbor, otherwise she would be matched to some a 1 i inM . Thus the matching M 2 restricted to the vertex set A 0 ∪ B 0 is stable since these women receive proposals only from the bottom layer men and they dispose according to their preference lists in G. Also, the matching M 2 restricted to the vertex set A 1 ∪ B is stable. Hence M 2 has no blocking edges in A 1 ×(B 1 ∪B 0 ) or in A 0 × B 0 . It follows that every edge labeled (1, 1) has to be in A 0 × B 1 .
Lemma 2.2. Every edge (a, b)
Proof. Let (a, b) be an edge in A 1 × B 0 . We first claim that a must be matched in M 2 . Otherwise, a 1 would have proposed to b. However b ∈ B 0 , which means that b never received a proposal from a top layer neighbor during the entire course of the algorithm, otherwise b would have accepted such a proposal. So a 1 has to be matched inM to a woman that a ranks better than b. So vote a (b, M 2 (a)) = −1.
The We now show (ii). Suppose y 0 ∈ A 0 . There are edges (some of them possibly labeled (1, 1)) between A 0 and B 1 . However once an edge of A 0 × B 1 is traversed in ρ, the path ρ gets stuck in A 1 ∪ B 1 . This is so by the same argument as in the earlier case. Once ρ reaches a vertex x i ∈ B 1 , its matched partner y i ∈ A 1 and thereafter all the vertices have to be in A 1 ∪ B 1 as there are no edges between A 1 and B 0 in G M2 and because the matched partners of all vertices in B 1 are in A 1 .
Suppose y 0 ∈ B 1 , a similar argument holds: though there are edges (possibly labeled (1, 1)) between B 1 and A 0 , once an edge of B 1 × A 0 is traversed in ρ, the path ρ gets stuck in A 0 ∪ B 0 because every vertex in A 0 is matched to a vertex in B 0 and there are no edges between B 0 and A 1 in G M2 . So once ρ reaches a vertex x i ∈ A 0 , thereafter all the vertices have to be in A 0 ∪B 0 . Thus we have shown that in both cases of (ii), there can be at most one edge labeled (1, 1) in ρ. This finishes the proof of the lemma.
We will refer to an alternating path y 0 , x 1 , y 1 , . . . in G M2 where y 0 ∈ A 1 ∪B 0 as a type (i) alternating path and an alternating path y 0 , x 1 , y 1 , . . . in G M2 where y 0 ∈ A 0 ∪ B 1 as a type (ii) alternating path.
We now show Theorem 1.4 (from Section 1) for k = 2. For any ρ ∈ M 2 ⊕M ′ , where M ′ is any matching in G, we need to evaluate φ(M 2 ⊕ρ,
) where the sum is over all the vertices u in ρ.
); we will now use Lemma 2.3 on ρ.
Proof of Theorem 1.4 for k = 2. We now show that the matching M 2 satisfies properties (1)- (3) 
both these values were −1 to begin with and they both remain −1 after assuming that u and v are unmatched in M ′ . So for the purpose of evaluating φ(M 2 , M ′ ) and
Property (1) . Let ρ be an alternating cycle in M 2 ⊕ M ′ . Since every edge of M 2 is either in A 0 × B 0 or in A 1 × B 1 , there has to exist a vertex x ∈ A 1 ∪ B 0 in ρ. Thus ρ \ {(x, M 2 (x))} is a type (i) alternating path. Lemma 2.3 tells us that there can be no (1, 1) edge in such an alternating path and since ρ is in G M2 , it follows that every edge of ρ is labeled either (1, −1) or  (−1, 1) . If the number of vertices in ρ is 2t, then we have t vertices in ρ (the −1 votes) who prefer M 2 to M 2 ⊕ ρ and t vertices in ρ (the 1 votes) who prefer
Property (2) . This follows directly from Claim 1 and Lemma 2.3. Claim 1 states that every vertex unmatched in M 2 has to be in A 1 ∪ B 0 . So any alternating path ρ with respect to M 2 in G M2 that starts with an unmatched vertex has to be a type (i) alternating path. There can be no (1, 1) edge in ρ by Lemma 2.3. So among the vertices of ρ, the number of −1 votes is at least the number of 1 votes, so φ(
Property (3) .This follows directly from Lemma 2.3. Let ρ be any alternating path with respect to M 2 in G M2 such that both the endpoints of ρ are matched in M 2 . So neither endpoint is matched in M ′ and both these vertices prefer M 2 to M ′ . There can be at most one edge labeled (1, 1) in ρ by Lemma 2.3. Every other edge (say, there are t of them) is labeled either (1, −1) or (−1, 1) . Thus among all the vertices of ρ, there are 2 + t who prefer M 2 to M ′ whereas at most 2 + t prefer
For any matching M ′ in G, using the above result (Theorem 1.4 for k = 2) we have:
Thus M 2 is popular. We now show that M 2 is a largest popular matching. Recall that an augmenting path with respect to M 2 is an alternating path p where both the endpoints of p are unmatched in M 2 .
Lemma 2.4. There is no augmenting path with respect to
Proof. Let p = b 0 , a 1 , b 1 . . . , b k , a k+1 be an augmenting path wrt M 2 in G M2 . It follows that b 0 ∈ B 0 and a k+1 ∈ A 1 by Claim 1. Since M 2 uses only edges of (A 0 × B 0 ) ∪ (A 1 × B 1 ), p has to contain an edge between a vertex b j−1 ∈ B 0 and a vertex a j ∈ A 1 . However we know there is no such edge in G M2 (by Lemma 2.2). Thus there exists no augmenting path wrt M 2 in G M2 .
, recall that we can restrict M ′ to G M2 . Since there is no augmenting path with respect to M 2 in G M2 (by Lemma 2.4), the augmenting path p in G breaks into sub-paths p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p s in G M2 , where p 1 and p s have one endpoint each unmatched in M 2 . This endpoint has to be in A 1 ∪ B 0 (by Claim 1), thus there is no (1, 1) edge in p 1 and in p s by Lemma 2.3.
So all edges of M ′ in p 1 (say, there are t of them) are only (1, −1) and (−1, 1) edges. Also, p 1 has another endpoint u that is unmatched in M ′ (restricted to G M2 ) but is matched in M 2 , so u prefers M 2 to M ′ . So p 1 has 2t + 1 vertices, where t + 1 of these prefer M 2 to M ′ and the remaining t prefer
• For p i ∈ {p 2 , . . . , p s } (the other sub-paths that p gets split into in G M2 ), we have by Theorem 1.
• We also have φ(
Hence it follows that φ(
Hence no matching of size larger than |M 2 | can be popular, since M 2 is more popular than such a matching. Thus M 2 is a largest popular matching in G. The time taken to compute M 2 is O(m). This completes the proof of Theorem 1.1 stated in Section 1.
The generalized algorithm
In this section we will generalize Algorithm 1. We saw in Section 2 that Algorithm 1 computes a largest popular matching. This algorithm on the example in Figure 2 Suppose we want a larger matching in this graph at the cost of suffering some small unpopularity factor. Then we could further promote the unmatched a 1 3 into an even higher layer (call it layer 2) so that it becomes a 2 3 and make it propose to b 2 . Let the preference list of any woman have her layer 2 neighbors at the very top, followed by her layer 1 neighbors, and then the layer 0 neighbors; within each layer, the ordering is as per her preference list in G. So when b 2 receives a proposal from a Just as Algorithm 1 was an efficient implementation of the idea of partitioning the vertex set into two layers: bottom and top, we now show an efficient implementation of the generalized algorithm that partitions the vertex set into k layers, where k is any integer ≥ 2. Let the k layers be layer 0, layer 1, . . . , layer k − 1, where layer 0 is the bottommost layer and layer k − 1 is the topmost layer. We want the men in layer k − 1 to get the most preferential treatment and then the men in layer k − 2, and so on. To implement this idea efficiently, we will work with the following augmented graphG k = (Ã k ∪ B, E) where the setÃ k of men is ∪ • In b's preference list inG k , we have a ℓ1 i preferred to a ℓ2 j iff either ℓ 1 > ℓ 2 , or ℓ 1 = ℓ 2 and b ranks a i better than a j in her preference list in G.
• Thus for any b ∈ B, layer k − 1 neighbors are the most preferred, then come the layer k−2 neighbors, and so on and at the bottom come the layer 0 neighbors in b's preference list inG k .
We now present Algorithm 2, whose code is the same as that of Algorithm 1, except for line 9, where "if ℓ = 0" gets replaced by "if ℓ < k − 1" here. delete the first element a ℓ from Q.
4.
let b be the most preferred neighbor of a ℓ now. 6. ifM (b) exists then add this man to Q. 7.
now setM (b) = a ℓ . 8.
9.
else if ℓ < k − 1 then 10.
add a ℓ+1 to Q.
11.
end if 12. end while 13. ReturnM . is inserted into Q and starts proposing from the top of his preference list when he gets deleted from Q. As in Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2 returnsM which translates in a straightforward manner to a matching M k in G: Label every edge e = (u, v) ∈ E \ M k by (α e , β e ), where α e = vote u (v, M k (u)) and β e = vote v (u, M k (v)).
The proof of Lemma 3.2 is identical to that of Lemma 2.2. Lemma 3.3 allows us to lower bound |M k |. Proof. Let p = b 0 , a 1 , b 1 . . . , b t , a t+1 be an augmenting path with respect to M k in G. We know from Claim 2 that b 0 ∈ B 0 and a t+1 ∈ A k−1 , we also know that M k uses only edges of ∪ k−1 ℓ=0 (A ℓ × B ℓ ). In the first place, there is no edge in G between an unmatched b 0 ∈ B 0 and any a 1 ∈ A 1 , since such an edge would not be a (−1, −1) edge (because b 0 prefers being matched to a 1 to being unmatched in M k ), contradicting Lemma 3.2. Also, there is no edge between B ℓ and ∪ t≥ℓ+2 A t (by Lemma 3.1).
At the other end, there is no edge between an unmatched vertex in A k−1 and any vertex b k−2 in B k−2 , as b k−2 ∈ B k−2 would accept such a proposal and not be in B k−2 then. So the first edge of p has to be from B 0 × A 0 and the last edge has to be from B k−1 × A k−1 . Thus the shortest possible augmenting path has the following structure between the sets in our partition:
, where every A i -B i edge here is an edge of M k . Thus there have to be at least k edges of M k in p. So |p| ≥ 2k + 1.
Proof. Every path in M k ⊕ M * that is augmenting with respect to M k , has length at least 2k+1 (by Lemma 3.3). So every such path has t edges of M k and t + 1 edges of
This finishes the lower bound on the size of M k . We now upper bound its unpopularity factor.
Proof. There is no blocking edge in A ℓ × ∪ j≤ℓ B j for any ℓ, since M k restricted to edges in A ℓ × ∪ j≤ℓ B j is obtained by running Gale-Shapley algorithm on these vertices, with the men in A ℓ proposing and the women in ∪ j≤ℓ B j disposing. Thus every blocking edge to M k has to be ∪ k−2 ℓ=0 (A ℓ × ∪ j>ℓ B j ).
Theorem 3.1. Let ρ = y 0 , x 1 , y 1 , . . . , x t−1 , y t−1 , x t be an alternating path with respect to M k in G, where (x i , y i ) ∈ M k for i ≥ 1. Then the number of edges labeled (1, 1) in ρ is at most the number of edges labeled (−1, −1) in ρ + (h − ℓ), where y 0 ∈ A ℓ and x t ∈ B h .
Proof. Let ρ = y 0 , x 1 , . . . , y t−1 , x t be an alternating path where each (x i , y i ) ∈ M k . Suppose y 0 ∈ A ℓ and x t ∈ B h . The claim is that the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ + (h−ℓ). We prove this claim by induction on the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ.
Suppose there are no (−1, −1) edges in ρ. Then we will show that the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most h − ℓ. We know from Lemma 3.1 that there are no edges between A ℓ and ∪ j<ℓ−1 B j and there are only (−1, −1) edges between A ℓ and B ℓ−1 by Lemma 3.2. Thus the entire path ρ is stuck in layers ≥ ℓ. There are no (1, 1) edges in A ℓ × B ℓ . So while the x i 's are in B ℓ (which forces the y i 's to be in A ℓ ), we do not encounter any (1, 1) edge in ρ. Hence it is necessary to traverse an edge in ρ between some y j ∈ A ℓ and x j+1 ∈ B ℓ ′ , for some ℓ ′ > ℓ so that a (1, 1) edge is encountered (by Lemma 3.4). For any ℓ and ℓ ′ > ℓ, once we traverse an edge between A ℓ and B ℓ ′ , the rest of the path ρ gets stuck in layers ≥ ℓ ′ . Once the path jumps to a higher layer, since there is no way it can come back to a lower layer, it follows that we are allowed at most h − ℓ jumps in layer numbers from y 0 ∈ A ℓ to x t ∈ B h . Thus we can traverse at most h − ℓ edges labeled (1, 1) in ρ (by Lemma 3.4) . This settles the base case.
We assume by induction hypothesis that the claim is true when the number of (−1, −1) edges in any alternating path is at most i − 1. Let ρ have i ≥ 1 edges labeled (−1, −1) and let (y j−1 , x j ) be one of these (−1, −1) edges in ρ. Let y j−1 ∈ A r and x j ∈ B s . Deleting the sub-path x j−1 , y j−1 , x j , y j (this consists of one (−1, −1) edge and two edges of M k ) from ρ, we get two alternating sub-paths ρ 1 and ρ 2 , where ρ 1 = y 0 , x 1 , . . . , x j−1 and ρ 2 = y j , x j+1 , . . . , x t . Since the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ 1 and in ρ 2 is at most i − 1, by applying the induction hypothesis on ρ 1 and on ρ 2 , it follows that the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ 1 +(r − ℓ)+ the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ 2 + (h − s), where the (r − ℓ) term comes from ρ 1 and the (h − s) term comes from ρ 2 .
The number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ 1 + the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ 2 is one less than the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ. Thus the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ + (r − ℓ) + (h − s) − 1. Since there is an edge between y j−1 ∈ A r and x j ∈ B s , it follows from Lemma 3.1 that s ≥ r − 1. Hence h − ℓ + r − s − 1 ≤ h − ℓ. Thus the claim holds when the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ is i. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 1.4. We now show that M k satisfies properties (1)-(3) of Theorem 1.4 stated in Section 1. Let M ′ be any matching in G.
Property (1) . Let ρ ∈ M k ⊕ M ′ be an alternating cycle. Every edge of M k is in ∪ k−1 ℓ=0 (A ℓ × B ℓ ). Let (a, b) be an edge in M k ∩ ρ. So ρ \ {(a, b)} is an alternating path a, . . . , b where a ∈ A t and b ∈ B t , for some t. Hence it follows from Theorem 3.1 that the number of (1, 1) edges in ρ is at most the number of (−1, −1) edges in ρ. Each of the other edges of ρ \ M k is labeled either (−1, 1) or (1, −1) . Thus among the vertices of ρ, the number of 1 votes (votes in favor of M ′ ) is at most the number of −1 votes (votes in favor of M k ). Thus
